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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Vicki Jensen appeals from the restitution order associated with her 
conviction for first degree murder. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Vicki Jensen pled guilty to first degree murder. (#27465 R.', pp.94-95.) 
She was sentenced on March 14, 2001 to a determinate life sentence. (Id.) In 
July 2007, the district court entered a restitution order for Jensen and two co- 
defendants to pay $22,500 to the ldaho Industrial Commission for funeral 
expenses and death benefits on behalf of the victim. (R., pp.14-17.) The order 
was entered without hearing, and served on Jensen's counsel, the Twin Falls 
County Public Defender's Office. (Id.) 
In March 2008, Jensen filed a "motion to proceed with an untimely appeal" 
of the restitution order.' (R., pp.24-25, 44.) In June 2008, she filed an "appeal of 
order of restitution." (R., pp.19-21, 44-45.) The district court construed the latter 
motion as an 1.R.C.P 60(b) motion requesting relief from a final judgment, and set 
a hearing, which was held on September 22, 2008. (R., pp.27-32, 36; see 
generally Tr., pp.4-32.) 
' The record from ldaho Supreme Court docket #27465 has been augmented 
into the appellate record. (See 1/13/09 Order Augmenting Appeal.) 
The district court did not receive this motion in March 2008. However, during a 
September 2008 hearing, Jensen produced a time-stamped copy of the motion 
which contained the date March 6, 2008. This motion was admitted into 
evidence. The district court subsequently found that Jensen actually filed her 
"motion to proceed with an untimely appeal" on March 6, 2008. (R., p.44; 9/22/08 
Tr., p.15, L.25-p.17, L.7.) 
Following that hearing, the district court denied Jensen's motion to 
proceed with an untimely appeal of the restitution order, and her request for relief 
under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(l) - (6), finding both untimely. (R., pp.47-54.) However, the 
district court granted Jensen's motion to set aside the restitution order pursuant 
to the provision of 1.R.C.P 60(b) that preserves preexisting powers of the court to 
grant relief from civil judgments within one year after the judgment was entered, 
when the judgment was "obtained against a party who was not personally served 
with summons and complaint either in the state of ldaho or in any other 
jurisdiction, and who has failed to appear in said action." (R., pp.54-57.) 
The district court set aside the restitution order, and instructed the state to 
file a formal restitution motion within thirty days if it still wished to pursue 
restitution. (R., pp.57-58.) The state did so, and a restitution hearing was set. 
(R., pp.62-63; see generally, Tr., pp.33-72.) 
At the restitution hearing, Jensen did not contest the amount of restitution 
that was ordered. (Tr., p.38, L.14 - p.39, L.3.) Instead, Jensen presented 
testimony about her lack of ability to pay restitution, and her financial needs while 
incarcerated, and argued that restitution should not be ordered. (Tr., p.42, L.5 - 
p.43, L.lO; p.45, L.3 - p.51, L.12; p.57, L.16 - p.59, L.22.) Jensen also argued 
that the district court lost jurisdiction to order restitution during the state's delay in 
requesting it originally. (Tr., p.57, Ls.10-15.) 
The court considered the lack of prejudice suffered by Jensen during the 
delay, and Jensen's financial needs and ability to pay in ordering Jensen to pay 
$22,550, jointly and severally with her co-defendants, to the ldaho Industrial 
Commission. (Tr., p.61, L.14 - p.72, L.9; R., pp.70-71.) Jensen timely appealed 
this second restitution order. (R., pp.74-77.) 
Jensen states the issues on appeal as: 
1 Did the district court have jurisdiction to order restitution in 
Ms. Jensen's case? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it ordered Ms. 
Jensen to pay $22,500 in restitution in light of her inability to 
pay? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court lack jurisdiction under 1.C. § 19-5304(10) to set aside 
Jensen's original restitution order? 
2. If the district court had jurisdiction to set aside Ms. Jensen's original 
restitution order, has Jensen failed to show that the court lacked 
jurisdiction to enter either restitution order? 
3. Has Jensen failed to show that the district court abused its discretion 
when it ordered Jensen to pay $22,500 in restitution? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction To Set Aside Jensen's Oriainal Restitution 
Order 
A. Introduction 
The district court lacked jurisdiction under I.C. § 19-5304(10) to set aside 
Vicki Jensen's original restitution order pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b). 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Whether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of law that may be raised 
at any time, and over which appellate courts exercise free review." State v. 
Jones, 140 ldaho 755,757, 101 P.3d 699,701 (2004). 
C. The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction To Set Aside Jensen's Oriainal 
Restitution Order, And Therefore, The Original Restitution Order Is Still 
Valid 
The ldaho Supreme Court "has long recognized that a court's jurisdiction 
to amend or set aside the judgment in a case does not continue forever." State 
v. Jakoski, 139 ldaho 352, 354-355, 70 P.3d 711, 713-714 (2003) (citations 
omitted). Absent a statute or rule extending its jurisdiction, the trial court's 
jurisdiction to amend or set aside a judgment expires once the judgment 
becomes final, either by expiration of the time for appeal or affirmance of the 
judgment on appeal. Id. at 355, 70 P.3d at 714. 
ldaho Code 5 19-5304(10) provides that "[a] defendant, against whom a 
restitution order has been entered, may, within forty-two (42) days of the entry of 
the order of restitution, request relief from the restitution order in accordance with 
the ldaho rules of civil procedure relating to relief from final orders." 
Pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304(10), a defendant against whom restitution has 
been ordered has two options to contest the order - she may appeal the 
restitution order directly, or she may request relief from the order in accordance 
with the ldaho rules of civil procedure, such as I.R.C.P. 60(b), that relate to relief 
from final orders. State v. Fortin, 124 ldaho 323, 328, 859 P.2d 359, 364 (Ct. 
App. 1993); State v. Bvbee, 115 ldaho 541, 542 n.1, 768 P.2d 804, 805 n.1 (Ct. 
App. 1989). Thus, if a defendant chooses to appeal her restitution order, that 
appeal must come within 42 days of the entry of the order of restitution. I.C. fj 
19-5304(10). If a defendant chooses to request relief from the restitution order 
under the ldaho rules of civil procedure, that request must come within 42 days 
of the entry of the order of restitution. Id. No matter which avenue a defendant 
chooses, the challenge or request for relief from the order must come within 42 
days of the entry of the order of restitution. Id. 
In the present case, the district court correctly denied as untimely both 
Jensen's direct appeal of the original restitution order, and her request for relief 
under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(l) and (6)3, both of which were filed months after the 
restitution order was entered. (R., pp.43-54.) 
At the time Jensen filed her "appeal of order of res.titutionn, which the court 
construed as a request for relief pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b), that rule stated that a 
motion brought pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b)(1),(2),(3), and (6) must be brought 
within six months after the judgment is entered. The district court determined 
that only I.R.C.P. 60(b)(l) and (6) were potentially applicable to this case, and 
that Jensen's motion was thus untimely with regards to those provisions. (R., 
pp.50-54.) 
However, the court granted Jensen's request for relief and set aside the 
restitution order under the provision of 1.R.C.P 60(b) applicable to default 
judgments, which preserves a district court's pre-existing right "to set aside, as 
provided by law, within (1) year after judgment was entered, a judgment obtained 
against a party who was not personally served with summons and complaint 
either in the state of Idaho or in any other jurisdiction, and who has failed to 
appear in said action." (R., pp.54-57). The district court found that Jensen's 
motion under 1.R.C.P 60(b) was timely with regards to this provision, and its one- 
year time limit. (R., pp.54-57.) 
The state first asserts that in setting aside the original restitution order, the 
district court erred by treating the restitution order as a default judgment subject 
to the set-aside provisions of I.R.C.P. 60(b). In this criminal case, Jensen had 
obviously appeared as a party and was represented by counsel. Thus, the 
district court did not have the jurisdiction to utilize I.R.C.P. 60(b) to set aside 
Jensen's restitution under the provision of that rule intended to grant relief to 
those who never appeared or were personally served in a civil action. 
Even if the district court had the jurisdiction to treat Jensen's original 
restitution order as a default judgment subject to I.R.C.P. 60(b), and to consider 
the restitution portion of Jensen's criminal case as a separate civil proceeding in 
which she never appeared or was personally served, it was still jurisdictionally 
barred from utilizing I.R.C.P. 60(b) by the time restriction imposed by I.C. 5 19- 
5304(10). The district court addressed I.C. 3 19-5304(10), but read that statute's 
42-day time restriction as permissive rather than mandatory. The district court 
found that I.C. § 19-5304(10) merely provided a defendant the option to either 
request relief from a restitution order within 42 days, or request relief sometime 
later, as long as the motion complied with the time restrictions of the ldaho rules 
of civil procedure: 
In the absence of contrary appellate opinion the [clourt holds 
that as a matter of law that the 42 day limitation provided in I.C. 3 
19-5304(10) does not preclude Jensen's [mlotion provided she has 
complied with the time requirements of Rule 60(b). The statute 
provides that the defendant "may, within forty-two (42) days of the 
entry of the order of restitution, request relief from the restitution 
order." Id. (emphasis added). A plain reading of the statute gives a 
defendant the right, but [not] the mandatory duty, to file within 42 
days. 
(R., p.52 (emphasis in original).) 
The district court's reading of I.C. § 19-5304(10) is inconsistent with the 
plain meaning and legislative intent of the statute. The statute states that a 
defendant "may.. . request relief from the restitution order.. ." The permissive 
"may" applies to the defendant's choice of whether to request relief from a 
restitution order or not. If a defendant does choose to request relief, I.C. 5 19- 
5304(10) limits that request in two ways. State v. Levicek, 131 ldaho 130, 
953 P.2d 214 (1998) (recognizing I.C. § 19-5304(10) as a statute which limits 
appellate review of restitution orders). First, a defendant may only request relief 
in accordance with the ldaho rules of civil procedure. Second, the request must 
come within 42 days of the entry of the order of restitution. 
In the present case, however, the district court applied the permissive 
"may" to the secohd restriction, providing the defendant the choice of whether to 
abide by it or not, rendering the time frame of "42 days" a nullity. This is contrary 
to the well-settled principle in ldaho that in construing a statute, "effect must be 
given to all the words of the statute if possible, so that none will be void, 
supeffluous, or redundant." Ameritel Inns. Inc. v. Pocatello-Chubbuck Auditorium 
or Communitv Center Dist., 146 Idaho 202, -, 192 P.3d 1026, 1028 (2008) 
(quoting In re Winton Lumber Co., 57 ldaho 131, 136, 63 P.2d 664, 666 (1936)). 
This rule of statutory construction applies to criminal statutes as well as civil. 
See State v. Mercer, 143 ldaho 108, 109, 138 P.3d 308, 309 (2006); State v. 
-
Griffith, 127 ldaho 8, 10-1 1, 896 P.2d 334, 336-337 (1995). 
While there was evidence and factual findings that Jensen did not receive 
personal notice of the restitution order until several months after its entry (R., 
p.45), still, under any possible reading of the facts, her request for relief from the 
restitution order was untimely under a proper reading of I.C. 3 19-5304(10). She 
did not file within 42 days of the time the restitution order was entered, or even 
within 42 days of the time the district court found that Jensen had actual notice of 
the order.4 It was not until June 2008, approximately six months after she had 
actual notice of the restitution order, and approximately eleven months after the 
order was entered, that Jensen filed her "appeal of order of restitution," a motion 
that the court construed as a request for relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b). (R., pp. 28, 
In addition, as explained by the ldaho Court of Appeals in Hoopes v. 
Baqley, 117 ldaho 1091, 793 P.2d 1263 (Ct. App. 1990): 
The district court found that Jensen received personal notice of the restitution 
order in December 2007. (R., p.45.) Jensen did not file anything with the court 
until March 2008, when she filed her "motion to proceed with an untimely 
appeal", which was subsequently denied. (R., p.44,47-50.) 
[Rlule 6O(b)(6) has clearly defined limits. The party making 
a Rule 60(b)(6) motion must demonstrate unique and compelling 
circumstances justifying relief. See Puphal v. Puphal, 105 ldaho 
302, 669 P.2d 191 (1983). The motion cannot be a disguised 
substitute for a timely appeal. Id. We have previously stated that 
where an appeal from the judgment is the proper remedy, "Rule 
60(b)(6) may not be used as an end-run around the time limits of 
I.A.R. 14." Stauffer, supra, 112 ldaho at 142, 730 P.2d at 1062. 
Hoopes, 117 ldaho at 1093-94, 793 P.2d at 1265-66. 
As in Hoopes, Jensen plainly tried to use I.R.C.P. 60(b) as a substitute for 
a timely appeal. Any alleged error of the district court under of I.C. § 19-5304(10) 
could have been addressed by timely appeal, if not within 42 days from the entry 
of the restitution order, certainly no later than 42 days of Jensen's actual notice of 
the order. 
The 42 day time limit in 1.C. § 19-5304(10) is a jurisdictional one. 
Although the district court agreed to hold a hearing on Jensen's I.R.C.P. 60(b) 
motion and decide the issue on the merits, the court lacked jurisdiction to even 
consider Jensen's request for relief. The district court's power to grant relief 
pursuant to ldaho Code § 19-5304(10) had expired 42 days after the issuance of 
the restitution order, or at least, 42 days after Jensen had actual notice of it. 
Jensen failed to cite any statute or rule that would extend the district court's 
jurisdiction to set aside the judgment entered against her. This Court should 
affirm the original restitution order because it was validly entered and Jensen's 
subsequent untimely challenge to the order was jurisdictionally barred. 
II. 
In The Alternative. If The District Court Had Jurisdiction To Consider Jensen's 
Motion, It Also Had Jurisdiction To Enter The Second Restitution Order 
A. Introduction 
Jensen contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter either of 
the two restitution orders against her, because the state's delay in seeking the 
first restitution order was not "necessary" under I.C. § 19-5304(6). (Appellant's 
brief, pp.5-10.) Jensen's argument, however, ignores the procedural history of 
this case. 
ldaho Code § 19-5304(6) granted the district court jurisdiction to enter the 
first restitution order. Since Jensen failed to appeal that order, this Court lacks 
jurisdiction to entertain a challenge to its entry. The second restitution order was 
entered as a result of Jensen's own 1.R.C.P 60(b) motion requesting that the 
district court re-establish jurisdiction over her case and provide relief from the first 
restitution order. If the district court had jurisdiction to consider her I.R.C.P. 60(b) 
motion and set aside her first restitution order, then it necessarily had jurisdiction 
to enter the second restitution order. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Whether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of law that may be raised 
at any time, and over which appellate courts exercise free review." State v. 
Jones, 140 ldaho 755,757, 101 P.3d 699,701 (2004). 
C. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction To Hear Jensen's Challenae To The First 
Restitution Order 
A timely filed notice of appeal is a prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction. 
State v. Payan, 128 ldaho 866, 867, 920 P.2d 82, 83 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. 
m, 104 ldaho 891, 665 P.2d 190 (Ct. App. 1983). An appeal as a matter of 
right may be perfected "only by physically filing a notice of appeal ... within 42 
days from the date evidenced by the filing stamp ... on any judgment, order or 
decree of the district court appealable as a matter of right ...." I.A.R. 14(a); see 
also I.C.R. 54.3. 
ldaho Code 3 19-5304(6) reads, in relevant part, "[rlestitution orders shall 
be entered by the court at the time of sentencing or such later date as deemed 
necessary by the court." Id. The district court expressly utilized this authority in 
entering Jensen's first restitution order. (Tr., p.63, L.25 - p.65, L.12.) Jensen 
failed to appeal this order within 42 days of its entry, as required by I.A.R. 14. 
Thus, this Court has no jurisdiction to review whether the district court 
erroneously determined that entering a restitution order after sentencing was 
"necessary" under I.C. § 19-5304(6). 
Jensen attempts to circumvent the 42 day deadline of I.A.R. 14, and her 
failure to meet it, by framing her challenge as a jurisdictional issue. Jensen 
argues that ldaho Code § 19-5304(6) confers a jurisdictional requirement on the 
court, and that since the state's delay in requesting restitution was not 
"necessary," then the district court lacked jurisdiction to order restitution. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.5-10.) 
The plain language of I.C. § 19-5304(6), however, speaks of discretion, 
rather than jurisdiction. The statute expressly empowers a district court to order 
restitution after the time of sentencing, "as deemed necessary by the court." It is 
thus left to the sound discretion of a district court whether or not to order 
restitution later than the date of sentencing. While Jensen had the opportunity to 
challenge the district court's use of this discretion by filing a timely appeal from 
the original restitution order, she failed to do so. 
In arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to order the first 
restitution order, Jensen cites State v. Ferguson, 138 ldaho 659, 67 P.3d 1271 
(2002). (Appellant's brief, pp.5-6, 8.) Ferguson, however, timely appealed from 
the order of restitution in that case. Ferquson, 128 ldaho at 661, 67 P.3d at 
1273. Ferauson does not stand for the proposition than an appellate court may 
review a district court's determination of "necessity" under I.C. § 19-5304(6) with 
regards to an unappealed order. 
Jensen's reliance on Jakoski (Appellant's brief, p.6), is likewise unavailing. 
I.C. 3 19-5304(6) provides a mechanism to extend jurisdiction when "deemed 
necessary by the court." It is the underlying finding of necessity that Jensen 
challenges, but over which this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction. 
Because Jensen did not timely appeal from the entry of the first order of 
restitution, this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain any challenge to it. Jensen's 
claim that the district court erred by finding the timing necessary under the 
applicable statute may thus not be entertained on appeal. 
D. If The District Court Had Jurisdiction To Consider Jensen's Motion. It 
Necessarilv Had Jurisdiction to Enter The Second Restitution Order 
Jensen also contends the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter the 
second restitution order, from which she appeals. (Appellant's brief pp.5-10.) 
This argument however, is merely an attempt to bootstrap review of the first 
restitution order over which this Court lacks jurisdiction. 
As stated above, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the first, and 
unappealed, order of restitution. In addition, the district court lacked jurisdiction 
to set aside that order, under I.R.C.P. 60(b), as set forth above in Section I. If, 
however, the district court had jurisdiction to set aside the first restitution order on 
the grounds of lack of notice to the defendant under I.R.C.P. 60(b), Jensen has 
failed to assert any grounds for concluding that the district court somehow lost 
jurisdiction between the grant of her I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion, and entry of the 
second restitution order. Instead, Jensen merely argues that the delay in 
entering the first restitution order robbed the court's jurisdiction to enter the 
second one. 
This bootstrap argument should be rejected. This Court lacks jurisdiction 
to review the first restitution order. A timely appeal from the second order does 
not vest it with such jurisdiction. Jensen's argument that the second order is 
invalid because the first one was invites this Court to exceed its jurisdiction. 
111. 
The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Orderinq Jensen To Pay 
$22.500 In Restitution 
A. Introduction 
Jensen contends that the district court abused its discretion under I.C. § 
19-5304(7) by ordering her to pay $22,500 in restitution despite her financial 
needs while incarcerated, and her lack of financial resources and earning ability. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.10-I I .) The record however, reflects that the district court 
did consider these factors, and thus complied with I.C. $5 19-5304(7). 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision whether to order restitution is committed to the trial court's 
discretion, and the trial court's factual findings in relation to restitution will not be 
disturbed if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 687, 
692, 169 P.3d 275, 280 (Ct. App. 2007). 
C. The District Court Properly Considered Jensen's Ability To Pay Restitution 
Because It Properly Considered The Relevant Factors Of I.C. 5 19- 
5304(7) 
Idaho's restitution statute provides that the sentencing court "shall" order 
restitution for economic loss actually suffered by the victim. I.C. § 19-5304(2). 
Nevertheless, the court may decline to order restitution or order less than full 
restitution after considering other factors, including "the financial resources, 
needs, and earning ability of the defendant." I.C. § 19-5304(3), (7). While a 
district court is required to consider these factors, inability to pay neither 
precludes nor limits a restitution award; rather, ability to pay is only one factor for 
a court's consideration when it makes a discretionary restitution determination. 
State v. Ol~in,  140 ldaho 377, 379, 93 P.3d 708, 710 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing State 
v. Taie, 138 ldaho 878, 880, 71 P.3d 477, 479 (Ct. App. 2003)). In addition, 
"[tlhe immediate inability to pay restitution by a defendant shall not be, in and of 
itself, a reason to not order restitution." I.C. § 19-5304(7). 
In State v. Olpin, the defendant challenged a restitution order where at the 
restitution hearing, the district court did not specifically state that it had 
considered the defendant's ability to pay. m, 140 ldaho at 379-380, 93 P.3d 
at 710-711. This ability was referenced only in Olpin's PSI. Id. at 380. The 
ldaho Court of Appeals stated that it was stiil not convinced that the district court 
failed to adequately consider Olpin's ability to pay restitution, and the restitution 
order was affirmed. Id. 
In the restitution hearing of the present case, the district court expressly 
recognized the requirements of I.C. § 19-5304(7), including the defendant's 
financial needs and ability to pay. (Tr., p.66, Ls.5-9.) The court made factual 
findings regarding Jensen's ability to pay restitution, and recognized that Jensen 
will be incarcerated for the rest of her life, cannot attain parole, and currently 
earns only $0.20 an hour for penitentiary system work. (Tr., p.66, Ls.13-21.) 
The district court then expressed its consideration of Jensen's financial 
needs while incarcerated (Tr., p.68, L.24 - p.69, L.6), and reiterated its duty to 
consider the factors of I.C. $ 19-5304(7), and not outside, non-economic factors: 
What other factors can we look at in this case? One of the 
factors that I'm not going to look at is the nature of the crime, nor 
the reasons why restitution was ordered in this case. I understand 
the state's argument that this was a horrendous crime. I 
understand that it had a great deal of impact on the family, but I 
don't think that's one of the factors that I should be considering 
when setting restitution. Rather, I should be setting restitution 
based upon what subsection (7) says and that is to look at the 
economics of this and not look at the principles that [the prosecutor] 
has outlined. l want the record to show that I a'm not considering 
those factors in my decision today. 
When the legislature passed this law, they specifically 
provided that the current ability to pay restitution is a factor that I 
could look at, but, in and of itself, is not a reason not to order 
restitution. 
(Tr., p.69, Ls.7-23.) 
The district court then went on to discuss the ldaho Court of Appeal's 
holding in State v. Bvbee, 115 ldaho 541, 768 P.2d 804 (Ct. App. 1989). (Tr., 
p.69, L.24 - p.71, L.8.) Bybee was convicted of grand theft, and was ultimately 
ordered to pay over 1.5 million dollars in restitution. 115 ldaho at 542, 
768 P.2d at 805. Bybee argued that the amount was excessive given his 
incarceration, age, financial needs and inability to pay. Id. at 543. The ldaho 
Court of Appeals, however, found no abuse of discretion: 
Given the magnitude of the amounts involved here, we 
believe it unlikely that Bybee will ever meet the full amount of 
restitution ordered. But, in the event Bybee is able to obtain some 
assets, the victims should have ready access to the assets for 
satisfaction of their losses. The order of restitution will provide the 
essential avenue of relief to the victims. The order may be 
recorded as a judgment and the victims may execute as provided 
by law for civil judgments. I.C. § 19-5305. 
If the order required Bybee to make installment payments or if had 
set a deadline for paying restitution, we would be included to vacate 
the order. As it now stands, however, the order simply gives the 
victims the present ability to obtain a judgment. We see nothing 
wrong with that. 
Jensen, like Bybee, will very likely never fully repay the victims for her 
crime. That fact, standing alone, does not show an abuse of discretion. Further, 
while Jensen will be incarcerated the rest of her life, the district court recognized 
that there are ways incarcerated inmates can potentially obtain money, including 
inheritances, and gifts from friends and relatives. (Tr., p.66, Ls.16-21; p.71, L.23 
- p.72, L.6.) The victims of Jensen's crimes should have access to any assets 
that Jensen might come across. 
The district court, in summing up its proper consideration of the I.C. 3 19- 
5304(7) factors, stated, "In this case it's certainly undesirable from the standpoint 
of the defendant because of her limited financial ability, but I don't find that that is 
a reason not to order restitution in this case." (Tr., p.71, Ls.17-20.) 
In arguing that the district court abused its discretion by failing to 
adequately consider her ability to pay restitution, Jensen merely repeats the 
evidence that she presented at the restitution hearing, and essentially expresses 
disagreement with the district court's eventual decision. (Appellant's brief, 10- 
12.) Jensen thus does not provide argument that the district court actually failed 
to consider her ability to pay restitution, nor does she highlight any part of the 
record that would indicates as much. The fact that the Jensen disagrees with the 
district court's decision does not amount to an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court a%rm the district court's first 
order of restitution, or, in the alternative, that this Court affirm the district court's 
second order of restitution 
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